受伤者
爱旭股份并非完美受害者。
下游都为硅料涨价叫苦。但爱旭股份之所以在涨价后业绩难看，也是为其扩张太激进买单。
爱旭2020年到2021年公布了超过80GW的新项目，投资超过400亿元。上游材料价格上涨，对爱旭这样扩张中的公司自然伤害加倍。
爱旭承受的主要是上游硅料、硅片企业压力，而更受冲击的是处于爱旭股份下游的组件厂商。
这些厂商长期处于两头挤压中。承担材料涨价同时，要承受国家发电平价上网政策约束，在整个产业链中向来毛利偏低。
组件厂可以分为三类，自己既做硅片、也做组件的龙头，如隆基、晶科能源 ，组件业务为主，硅料、硅片业务还未成规模的大公司，如东方日升、天合光能
，以及众多只有组件业务的中小规模厂商。
隆基、晶科能源等并没有伤筋动骨，他们早已锁定了硅料长单，自己也会调高硅片价格，对冲组件部分业务的风险。
东方日升、天合光能这样的公司虽然毛利会因此降低，但因为可以卖系统，也有电站业务，客源相对稳定，其实排产并没有太大变化。
真正遭殃的是中小组件厂及下游零散电站集成商。他们不可能有能力和资金提前锁定上游硅片，只能被动迎接冲击。“下游很痛苦。”一位电站集成商告诉36氪，他们只能想办法转型做BIPV、光储一体机。或者干脆“撂了”。
这其实是个危险的信号。爱旭股份预料的雪崩虽然没有在去年发生，但并不意味着今年危机不会出现。
硅料扩产在2021年还没有完成，因此的确去年有很大的供应问题。但今年三四季度，硅料产能充裕，中小厂商纷纷停工、减产，硅料会出现过剩的风险。爱旭股份陈刚略显夸张的说法今年可能会成为现实。“整个行业都会出现剧烈的雪崩。”
产业链的确处于混乱中。爱旭2021年提到商务活动无法进行，刚谈完的生意还没执行又要根据新价格重谈，之前的合同成为废纸。在涨价一年后，今年7月，证券日报采访光伏电站开发企业时，这一现象还在继续发生。硅料价格上涨，组件供应端频繁违约、毁约。
很多人其实记得十多年前那次硅料涨价到暴跌的惊心。因为欧美光伏行业红火，硅料从2006年27美元/公斤一度涨到500美元/公斤。2008年，金融危机袭来，光伏补贴取消，需求暴跌，硅料价格一泻千里，曾经在高峰期疯狂扩张、锁单的无锡尚德破产。
当然，目前我国硅料已经国产化，不需要从海外进口，受国外价格波动小。加之政策红利，无论国内还是国外光伏行业都在黄金期，能消化足够多的产能。这一次硅料上涨后，不会重复过去的一地鸡毛。
可仍然不能忽视不安因素，欧美经济再次出现衰退迹象，2021年我国内光伏建设其实并没有达到市场预期，2022年疫情反复又增加不确定性。需求仍不明确，第四季度硅料产能完全释放后，市场或许会遭遇激烈动荡。
The whole industrial chain is at a delicate moment. The profits of the upstream silicon material manufacturers soared, and the downstream complained. On July 1, the shutdown schedule of a group of mainstream photovoltaic module manufacturers spread on
the Internet, including large companies such as Longji and Jingao.
Although the company quickly refuted the rumors, it is undeniable that downstream manufacturers are suffering.
Upstream is another picture. On the evening of July 4, Tongwei, a leading silicon material company, disclosed a semi annual performance forecast. It is expected that the net profit attributable to the parent company in the first half of 2022
will reach 12 billion yuan to 12.5 billion yuan, an increase of more than three times year-on-year. Tongwei's share price hit a new high on July 5, and the market value of the company exceeded 300billion yuan.
The "four heavenly kings of silicon materials", including Tongwei, have given good financial results thanks to the rising price of silicon materials and strong demand. The gross profit of GCL poly reached a record of 7.3 billion yuan in 2021.
The net profit attributable to the parent company of new energy in 2021 increased by six times, and the net profit attributable to the parent company of Daquan energy in the first quarter of this year also increased by more than six times.
However, dividends belong to only a small number of upstream and leading companies.
The "Four Heavenly Kings" have made soft money, but companies in the downstream component and power station industries have been squeezed more seriously. The latter was originally in the white hot competition, and the rising price of silicon
material made it difficult for downstream components and battery manufacturers to support.
Silicon material has risen from 60000 yuan / ton at the beginning of 2021 to 290000 yuan / ton now, and there is no sign of price reduction. Of course, the price rise of silicon material is largely due to the increase in installed capacity
under the "double carbon" policy, coupled with the current expansion of production has not been in place, and the imbalance between supply and demand. However, this year, there have also been doubts about upstream hoarding.
If prices remain high, small and medium-sized component manufacturers will either transform, close down, or bleed to make a living. In this wave of price increases, they had to accept a big purge. Of course, there is still some distance between
this and avalanche. After the dust settles, the industry may be left with a group of better companies or a recession.
some goods in short supply , hoarded or cornered for making excess or enormous profit
The price of silicon material has risen for a year and a half. The reason behind this is that the participants in different links of the industrial chain disagree.
As early as June 10, 2021, a non-public material of aixu Co., Ltd., a large downstream photovoltaic cell manufacturer, was circulated. In this report on the Symposium on hot and difficult issues in the photovoltaic industry, aixu Co., Ltd.
believes that the current silicon supply has reached 190gw, but this year the global terminal demand is difficult to reach 180 GW, and there is no problem of capacity mismatch. They believe that the reason why silicon materials remain high is that
"some enterprises can create the illusion of a serious shortage of polysilicon and silicon chips, which will help intermediate traders and all links of the industrial chain hoard and drive up prices."
They named one of the "some enterprises", that is, Tongwei group. Aixu described in detail that Tongwei believed that the "monthly pricing" rose too slowly and took out a small amount of silicon material to invite enterprises to bid every week.
Polysilicon prices refreshed on Monday and rose 37.2% in a month. All their production activities can only be suspended.
If it is true that as mentioned by aixu, Tongwei is waiting for the price to be sold. In fact, the silicon material idles in the upstream and rises in price, but it is not invested in the downstream.
On the day after aixu submitted the materials, the photovoltaic industry association that held the symposium also issued an appeal, calling on practitioners to resist excessive hoarding, bid up prices and speculation.
Tongwei shares quickly responded, saying that it "did not ship to any intermediate traders, nor did it bid up prices and hoard strange things." As for the price, it is determined by the relationship between supply and demand.
If we only look at theoretical data, there is indeed no shortage of supply this year. According to the prediction of PV InfoLink, an industry consulting company, the global demand for components will reach at least 223gw this year. Generally,
10000 tons of polysilicon can produce 3.5gw-4gw components, so 550000-63000 tons of polysilicon are required.
In 2021, the global polysilicon output was 642000 tons. Generally, the market supply-demand ratio is greater than 1.2, which is the balance of supply and demand, so there is a sharp rise in prices in the end. If the output of this year is the
same as that of last year, there will indeed be a big gap.
Since last year, the production lines of four leading silicon material plants have been put into operation, including poly GCL 20000 ton granular silicon project, Daquan energy 35000 ton polysilicon project, Tongwei 101000 ton capacity ramp
up. This has brought nearly 800000 tons of silicon. Asian silicon and Oriental hope to invest new production capacity in succession this year.
However, it needs to be considered that it will take half a year for the new production line to ramp up from production, and the capacity may not be fully released until the third and fourth quarters. Coupled with the repeated epidemic, logistics
also affects the arrival volume. Indeed, there will be a shortage in the first and second quarters of this year.
Under this delicate balance, it is difficult to find a clear culprit. The shortage of supply objectively exists, but the price rises so fast, which is more or less driven by the growing panic. After aixu, no more companies came forward to accuse
Tongwei and other silicon material manufacturers, but they were in the center of the vortex and naturally became the biggest target.
Injured person
Aixu shares is not a perfect victim.
Downstream are all complaining about the rising price of silicon materials. However, the reason why aixu's performance is poor after the price rise is also to pay for its aggressive expansion.
Aixu announced more than 80gw of new projects from 2020 to 2021, with an investment of more than 40billion yuan. The rise in the price of upstream materials will double the natural damage to companies like aixu, which is expanding.
Aixu is mainly under the pressure of upstream silicon materials and silicon wafer enterprises, and the component manufacturers downstream of aixu shares are more affected.
These manufacturers have been squeezed at both ends for a long time. While undertaking the price rise of materials, we should bear the constraints of the national power generation parity online policy, and the gross profit has always been low
in the whole industrial chain.
Component factories can be divided into three categories. They are not only the leaders of silicon chips, but also the leaders of components, such as Longji and Jinke energy. They are large companies whose component business is mainly, and
whose silicon material and silicon chip business has not yet become a scale, such as Dongfang Risheng, Trinasolar, and many small and medium-sized manufacturers who only have component business.
Longji, Jinke energy and others have not hurt their muscles and bones. They have already locked in the long list of silicon materials, and they will also raise the price of silicon wafers to hedge the risks of some component businesses.
Although the gross profit of companies such as Dongfang Risheng and Trinasolar will be reduced, because they can sell systems and have power station business, the source of customers is relatively stable. In fact, the production scheduling
has not changed much.
The real victims are small and medium-sized component factories and downstream scattered power station integrators. They cannot have the ability and funds to lock in the upstream silicon chip in advance, and can only passively meet the impact.
"Downstream is painful." A power station integrator told 36 krypton that they could only find ways to transform into BIPV and optical storage all-in-one machine. Or simply "put it down".
This is actually a dangerous signal. Although the avalanche expected by aixu shares did not happen last year, it does not mean that this year's crisis will not occur.
The expansion of silicon production has not been completed in 2021, so there was indeed a big supply problem last year. However, in the third and fourth quarters of this year, silicon material production capacity is abundant, and small and
medium-sized manufacturers have shut down and reduced production, which will lead to the risk of excess silicon material. AI Xu shares Chen Gang's slightly exaggerated statement may become a reality this year. "There will be a violent avalanche in
the whole industry."
The industrial chain is indeed in chaos. In 2021, aixu mentioned that business activities could not be carried out, and the newly negotiated business had not been implemented, and it had to be renegotiated according to the new price, and the
previous contract had become waste paper. One year after the price rise, this phenomenon continued to occur when securities daily interviewed photovoltaic power station development enterprises in July this year. The price of silicon material has risen,
and the component supplier has frequently defaulted and broken the contract.
Many people actually remember the shock of the sharp fall in the price of silicon more than a decade ago. Due to the booming photovoltaic industry in Europe and the United States, silicon materials once rose from $27 / kg in 2006 to $500 /
kg. In 2008, when the financial crisis hit, photovoltaic subsidies were canceled, demand plummeted, and the price of silicon fell sharply. Wuxi Suntech, which once expanded wildly and locked orders at the peak, went bankrupt.
Of course, at present, China's silicon materials have been localized and do not need to be imported from abroad, which is subject to small fluctuations in foreign prices. In addition to policy dividends, both domestic and foreign photovoltaic
industries are in the golden period and can absorb enough capacity. After the silicon material rises this time, it will not repeat the chicken feathers of the past.
However, disturbing factors cannot be ignored. The European and American economies show signs of recession again. In fact, China's domestic photovoltaic construction in 2021 did not meet market expectations, and the epidemic situation in 2022
repeatedly increased uncertainty. The demand is still unclear. After the silicon material capacity is fully released in the fourth quarter, the market may encounter fierce turbulence.
全国服务热线
